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British Codebreaking and American Diplomatic Telegrams, 1914-1915 
 
ABSTRACT During the First World War, British intelligence solved the United States’ diplomatic codes 
and were reading its diplomatic telegrams transmitted between Washington and U.S. diplomatic 
outposts throughout Europe. Controversy has emerged over when the British succeeded in solving 
these codes, with two historians relatively recently having claimed that British intelligence 
succeeded in doing so from the beginning of the war or soon after. Through a thorough 
consideration of the available documentation, this piece aims to correct these mistaken claims 
and to date the completion of the British solving of American codebooks to the middle phase of 
the war, to between October 1915 and January 1916. It seeks to lay reliable foundations for 
further work by showing that research into the wartime impact of British signals intelligence on 
Anglo-American relations is necessarily limited to only the middle and later phases of the war. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since its founding late last century, the subfield of intelligence history has very often been 
encapsulated by the phrase ‘the missing dimension’, and even though it has become something 
of a cliché, it has only become so because it remains so utterly true in many historical periods.1 
For the First World War, the gaps in our intelligence knowledge are more along the lines of 
gaping chasms, to the extent that one can virtually assume that almost every facet of the war is 
marked by an unexplored intelligence dimension.2 Yet as injurious to scholarship as the ignoring 
of intelligence has been, the belief that an intelligence angle remains missing in a particular area 
when in reality there simply was not any such dimension there can be as just as damaging and 
misleading. It raises unnecessary question marks over the existing historiography and invites 
scholars to pursue avenues of research leading at best to nowhere or, worse, to deeply flawed 
conclusions. 
For Anglo-American relations early in the First World War, this is precisely the case. Two 
historians have claimed relatively recently that the British were breaking American diplomatic 
codes from the beginning of the war or shortly thereafter—claims with the clear implication that 
there is a significant missing intelligence dimension to our understanding of Anglo-American 
relations early in the war.3 Previous work had only shown the British breaking American codes 
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from the middle phase of the war onwards—research that showed considerable potential for this 
avenue of investigation, demonstrating not only its capacity to offer meaningful contributions to 
the field of First World War intelligence studies, but also its ability to occasion the 
reconsideration of much wider and long-established conclusions.4 Given this prior research in 
combination with all of the complications and difficulties in Anglo-American relations early in 
the war, there is every reason to believe that any as-yet-unexplored intelligence angle would have 
the potential to fundamentally transform our understanding of this relationship in the first phase 
of the war. 
A close examination of the evidence relied upon by these two historians, which include noted 
academic historian Nicholas Lambert, however, does not support their contentions. This piece 
offers a considered examination of this evidence and demonstrates that the documents they cite 
do not, in fact, demonstrate any British codebreaking success with respect to the United States in 
the first part of the war. It then explores what limited reliable documentation exists about the 
origins of British codebreaking abilities vis-à-vis the United States. Although the remaining 
reliable evidence is sparse, it nevertheless shows that the British were breaking American codes 
only from the middle phase of the war onwards, a task that appears to have been completed 
sometime between September 1915 and January 1916. A previous article I wrote explored the 
role of this codebreaking in Anglo-American relations in early 1916; this piece aims to 
demonstrate that there is minimal scope for further research into this topic prior to the period 
explored in that article.5 
 
BACKGROUND 
Great Britain had no significant codebreaking capabilities in the years leading up to the First 
World War, but this changed rapidly with the outbreak of war in 1914.6 Two codebreaking 
groups were established. In the Admiralty, a group called Room 40, named after its original 
location in the Old Admiralty Building, was formed. Initially, it worked principally on German 
naval codes before eventually expanding into the diplomatic codes of Germany and other, 
mostly enemy, countries.7 
In the War Office, a codebreaking unit that for most of the war would be known as MI1(b) had 
originated out of a primitive pre-war intelligence group. A three-man team was formed at the 
beginning of the twentieth century within the Military Operations directorate, which came to be 
known as MO5(a) and was tasked with studying ciphers ‘among many “odds and ends”’. Their 
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work, however, was desultory and mostly academic until the outbreak of the First World War.8 
As the German military advanced through Belgium and into France in late 1914, the British army 
found itself ‘intercept[ing] enemy wireless’ messages, which MO5(a), now designated MO5(e), 
became tasked with deciphering. Diplomatic decryption work began early the next year, and the 
group was redesignated MO6(b) in April 1915. In December 1915, the Military Intelligence 
directorate was founded. The slowly expanding MO6(b) team was immediately relocated into the 
new directorate and given the designation MI1(b), which would follow it until 1919.9 For clarity, 
this article will hereafter refer to this section only by the name ‘MI1(b)’, rather than to expect the 
reader to keep track of its array of prior designations. 
As will be shown below, MI1(b) began working to solve American diplomatic codes early in 
1915, but only succeeded fully in the endeavour that autumn. The Americans had three principal 
codebooks that they used to encipher their transmissions. The most important was the Green 
Code of 1910, followed by the Blue Code of 1899. The Green Code was the principal codebook 
used by American embassies and ministries for higher-level communications, while the Blue 
Code was generally used for less important messages, or to transmit quotations of documents 
provided by a foreign government. A third codebook, the Red Code of 1876, was relegated to 
consular use and is unlikely to have been of any significance at the diplomatic level.10 Helpful for 
researchers, in the U.S. National Archives, the code each telegram was transmitted in almost 
always is noted in the upper right hand corner of the document—‘Green’, ‘Blue’, or ‘Red’—
along with the date, sender, and State Department time of decryption. Those without encryption 
were marked ‘Plain’ in the same place that the code would ordinarily be noted, and one readily 
finds many such examples in State Department files in this period.11 
None of these three codebooks provided strong security. All three belonged to a class of codes 
called ‘one-part codes’, in which each plaintext word or phrase was given a five-letter codeword 
or five-digit code number. As the entire code was contained in only a single volume, used to 
both encode and decode messages, however, the code had to be organized in alphabetical order. 
These were significantly less secure than ‘two-part codes’, in which separate volumes for 
encoding and decoding messages existed, with this more advanced type of code therefore 
constructed in a random, rather than alphabetical order.12 
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This question is particularly important because if MI1(b) would have succeeded in breaking the 
Green and Blue codes at the earlier times that has been claimed, they would have had a wealth of 
important intelligence material available to them. Anglo-American relations in the first year of 
the war was rocked by a series of controversies and marked by significant American diplomacy. 
Not only would the British have had the contents of the telegrams between Washington and the 
U.S.’s European diplomatic outposts, but they would have also had those between American 
President Woodrow Wilson and his close personal confidant Colonel Edward House, as the 
latter was present in Europe from February to June 1915.13 During House’s subsequent mission 
to Europe early the following year, he was extremely mindful of the contents of his telegrams 
and purposefully kept them as short and vague as possible.14 In 1915, however, House wholly 
trusted his coding arrangements and very frequently telegraphed detailed reports to Wilson.15 If 
the British had been reading these messages, it seems virtually certain that this would form an 
integral part of any accurate narrative of Anglo-American relations in this period—and that an 
exploration into this dimension could therefore significantly alter or even transform that 
narrative. For this reason, it is essential that the beginning of the British breaking American 
diplomatic codes be dated as accurately as possible. 
 
PREVIOUS HISTORICAL CLAIMS 
Two historians have claimed relatively recently that British intelligence had solved American 
codes prior to the autumn of 1915. Each relies on a different set of British documentation, 
which they believe are decrypts of American diplomatic telegrams from 1914 or early 1915. Both 
mistakenly interpret their respective sets of evidence. In reality, they have either uncovered 
decrypts that are actually from a later period or documents that are not in fact decrypts at all. 
Popular historian Paul Gannon, in his 2010 trade book Inside Room 40, makes an understandable 
and easily corrected mistake. He argued that the ‘first surviving copy of a decoded US telegram 
dates from 3 May 1915’,16 relying on a small cache of decrypts found in War Office files. This 
cache, consisting of 12 decrypts of American telegrams supposedly ranging in dates from May 
1915 to April 1916, contains four decrypts that the index to the file says are from 6-10 May 1915; 
the next in the file is from 25 September. On each of the four decrypts, however, the year ‘1915’ 
is not on the original, and has been pencilled in after the fact with a question mark, presumably 
by an archivist or someone preparing the file for the archives.17 Whoever pencilled in these dates 
was in error: originals of these telegrams can be located in American documentation, showing 
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that they were actually sent in 1916, not 1915.18 Only the decrypt dated 25 September 1915 can 
be shown to actually be from 1915.19 
More notably, academic historian Nicholas Lambert in his book Planning Armageddon pointed to 
intercepts of American diplomatic telegrams in two Admiralty blockade files from 1914 and 
1915.20 He used these to claim that in late 1914, British 
naval intelligence possessed irrefutable proof, in the form of intercepted telegrams 
between the State Department and its various legations in Europe, some encrypted and 
all sent via circuitous routes, that high-ranking U.S. officials were colluding with German 
traders. (British naval intelligence evidently was reading encrypted U.S. diplomatic traffic 
throughout the entire war rather than from the midpoint onward, as scholars have 
previously suspected.)21 
Later in his book, he uses one of these files to claim specifically that ‘British naval intelligence 
was listening’ when Wilson sent telegraphic instructions to House after the 7 May 1915 sinking 
by Germany of British passenger liner Lusitania.22 Fortunately Lambert does not attempt to build 
significantly on these claims, so only these particular assertions, rather than the broader historical 
conclusions he makes in his book, are challenged here. 
Lambert has clearly made a mistake in the decryption agency involved. American telegrams were 
decrypted by the War Office organization MI1(b), not by its naval counterpart Room 40. Indeed, 
Room 40 did not open its ‘political’ division, focussing on diplomatic codes, until the autumn of 
1915.23 Lambert cites a series of copies of American diplomatic telegrams, largely dealing with 
commercial affairs. His claim that ‘some [were] encrypted’, however, is unsupported by any of 
the evidence he cites. Indeed, as will be shown below, every indication is that these telegrams had 
been sent by the State Department without having been encrypted. 
The statement that they were ‘all sent via circuitous routes’ is misleading: telegraphic 
communications between the Central and Allied powers had been severed, and so telegrams 
between Washington and the American embassy in Berlin were usually and necessarily routed via 
the American embassy in Copenhagen, which then retransmitted them via underwater cables 
connecting neutral Denmark to Britain. (The ‘only alternative’ to using British cables to get 
around the Western Front communications blackout was a single French cable between 
Denmark and Calais, ‘which was interrupted for long periods’.)24 
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Most importantly, all of the internal evidence in the documents he cites clearly points to the 
intercepted telegrams having been sent without any encryption. While it may seem surprising 
from some of the telegrams’ contents that they were not encoded, the intercepts he cites come 
either from the chief censor’s office or directly from the individual censor’s offices at the various 
cable stations across the country. None shows any sign of having originated from MI1(b). These 
censor’s offices certainly had no meaningful decryption capabilities and it seems unlikely to the 
point of absurdity that MI1(b) would have had any reason to be supplying the chief censor, of all 
people, with copies of its decrypts—let alone individual censor’s offices. The censors were 
responsible for providing MI1(b) with copies of the encrypted diplomatic communications; 
MI1(b) had no reason to then return them after having decrypted them, and there was even less 
reason then for the documents to be distributed to the rest of the government from the censorship 
apparatus. Rather, the fact that they came directly from the censors is in fact clear evidence that 
the telegrams had been sent unencrypted. Additionally, the intercepts in the files that Lambert 
cites are formatted entirely differently from those documents known to be U.S. decrypts, and 
they were also widely distributed within the British government, which would have been unusual 
for documents of a highly secret nature.25 
Though this internal evidence is sufficient to reject Lambert’s claims, additional confirmation 
that these telegrams were not encrypted can be had as a pair of the intercepts in the files that 
Lambert points to are included in the published Foreign Relations of the United States series. Readily 
locatable in the U.S. National Archives, in one case, there is no information provided about its 
code of transmission26—an unusual omission that provides no indication that the telegram was 
encoded—while in the other, the telegram is clearly marked as having been sent ‘plain’ (i.e. en 
clair).27 Finally, Lambert points to a typed memorandum from May 1915 in these files, of 
unknown authorship, that reads, ‘it is evident from several telegrams that have been intercepted 
between Mr. Bryan and Mr. Page that America is about to make a strong protest against the 
detention of cotton ships’, which he uses to support his assertion. There is no indication that this 
refers to decrypts from MI1(b) not present in the file, and the virtually certain explanation is that 
it refers to telegrams sent en clair that gave this indication.28 
 
SOLVING THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC CODEBOOKS 
Setting these two mistaken claims aside, reliable evidence about MI1(b)’s diplomatic decryption 
efforts in 1915 is sparse. Much of what little documentation that exists was touched on briefly by 
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Peter Freeman in his 2008 article on MI1(b), but Freeman inaccurately claimed that ‘no decrypts 
of American telegrams from 1915 have survived’, and he made no attempt to date the beginning 
of British breaking of American codes.29 The emergence of a single 1915 decrypt, the one of 
American telegram from 25 September 1915, as well as a more thorough analysis of the other 
evidence, provides us a number of important clues that allow us to point more clearly to the 
autumn of 1915 rather than earlier in the year.30 
According to the official history of MI1(b), efforts to compile the three U.S. diplomatic codes 
began sometime ‘early in 1915’. Before then, the ‘early work of this section was confined entirely 
to enemy wireless’. As the front became static and the Germans replaced their army wireless 
communications with telegraph wires, however, the work that had consumed MI1(b) since the 
group’s formation ‘practically dried up’. The group lost its original raison d’être, and it was unable 
‘to occupy fully the time of the sub-section’ with ‘miscellaneous work, for Scotland Yard, the 
various prisoner of war messages that reached this country in cipher, etc’. The codebreaking 
group ‘accordingly turned their attention to the great volume of diplomatic code messages sent 
by cable routes which, owing to the censorship, were now for the first time accessible’, beginning 
with those of the United States. 
Even with the weakness of American codes, the official history makes clear that the efforts to 
solve them were slow going: ‘The work was entirely fresh to all members of the staff, there were 
no past records as guidance, and the problem of how to solve large code books had to be 
thought out ab initio.’ Nor could the group focus solely on neutral codes: ‘the work of the 
section [now] fell into two main divisions: the original work of dealing with purely enemy 
messages: and this new undertaking’. 31 These difficulties were compounded by the fact that the 
unit remained almost incomprehensibly small, with the group having expanded to only eight 
people by January 1916.32 
Precisely when the group finished solving American codes is unclear, but it appears to have been 
completed sometime between 25 September 1915 and January 1916. The first known decrypt of 
an encoded U.S. diplomatic telegram is that of the one dated 25 September 1915, surviving in 
that small War Office cache of decrypts mentioned above.33 The American original shows that 
the telegram was transmitted in ‘the secretary’s private code’, a cipher variant of the Green Code. 
While largely readable, this decrypt contains a surprising number of omissions. The telegram had 
not been garbled in transmission—the State Department received it without difficulty—so the 
Green Code must have remained incompletely solved by this point.34 The next decrypts that 
survive are not dated until late January 1916, and their fullness and accuracy make clear that 
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whatever difficulties MI1(b) was having in September 1915, the codes were solved completely by 
the year’s end.35 
It is likely, of course, that given MI1(b)’s progress with the Green Code by late September 1915, 
similarly incomplete decrypts of American telegrams would have been available prior to that 
date. There is no reliable evidence, however, to be able to make any firm claims about their 
degree of completeness at any stage over summer 1915. Given the alphabetical nature of 
American codebooks, moreover, one observes that a codebreaker would tend to hit something 
of a tipping point in solving them—that is, when a majority of the code had been solved, the rest 
of it would tend to come quickly as the alphabetical gaps in the dictionary become ever smaller. 
As such, it seems reasonable to infer that that tipping point likely would have been reached only 
a relatively short time before that incomplete decrypt on 25 September was generated. 
Of course, the possibility that the 25 September 1915 decrypt was not generated 
contemporaneously—that it was in fact decrypted weeks or even months subsequently—cannot 
be completely excluded. After all, the document does not contain a date of decryption, and so it 
is possible that the September date of the telegram may be misleading and that MI1(b) solved the 
codebook even later than this document would indicate. Yet the notion that MI1(b) came back 
to this decrypt at a later time seems unlikely. First, the decrypt is appended to an unencrypted 
intercept of a brief follow-up telegram sent on the same day from the American Ambassador in 
London to Washington, which enquired whether the decrypted telegram was decipherable. The 
longer it took MI1(b) to generate the decrypt, the likelier it seems that the two documents would 
have been separated, especially considering the scattershot contents of the file.36 Second, given 
the decrypt’s omissions and the “tipping point” nature of solving an alphabetical codebook, it is 
virtually certain there was only a relatively short interval during which the code was largely but 
incompletely solved. During this period, the codebreakers’ highest priority would be on the most 
recent telegrams and puzzling out the rest of the code; going back to deal with significantly older 
messages could not be high on its list of concerns, especially considering the unit’s shortage of 
staff. The decrypt was therefore most likely generated no more than a short time after the 
telegram was originally sent. 
There is no clear evidence giving us any indication of MI1(b)’s 1915 progress with the Blue 
Code, but the only particularly important messages in 1915-1916 sent in the Blue Code were 
those of Colonel House when in Europe, that is, February to early June 1915, and January to 
March 1916. (The State Department had evidently decided that as House had no official 
government position, he could not be given the department’s top code.) The Blue Code certainly 
had been solved by the time of House’s January 1916 arrival, but there is no indication that it 
had been solved during his earlier mission, leaving us to conclude that it appears to have been 
solved at some point in the interim.37 This indication is made more likely given evidence in a 
note by Malcolm Hay, who joined MI1(b) in December 1915 and became its head the following 
year. This note confirms that ‘until the beginning of 1916 the work of the War Office 
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cryptographic section was limited to…reconstruction of the American Diplomatic codebooks’.38 
The clear implication that the task of breaking the three American codes continued to consume 
MI1(b) for the final three months of 1915—most likely the Blue and Red codes, given that it had 
made so much progress on the Green code by September. It was not until 1916 that the group 
was able to turn its attentions to and solve the ‘Greek, Swiss, and Spanish codebooks’—which 
they deciphered much more quickly, the section having been ‘[h]elped by the experience gained 
during 1915 in deciphering the American codebooks’.39 All available evidence, therefore, points 
to MI1(b) having solved the American codebooks over the late summer and autumn of 1915, 
and no evidence points to an earlier period. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research has attempted to demonstrate that excluding the possibility of an important 
intelligence dimension in a particular historical area can be just as helpful to firming up our 
understanding of it as uncovering one. Given the extent to which we remain fundamentally 
ignorant of how intelligence shaped the First World War, it is likely that further intelligence 
research will continue to up-end existing narratives and transform our understanding of the war, 
not least of all in Anglo-American relations. Yet especially given that the surviving evidence 
about intelligence is often so fragmentary, it is essential that such research proceed from firm 
foundations. For signals intelligence in Anglo-American relations in the First World War, those 
foundations exist only after autumn 1915. 
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